Fifth Service Branch - Alpha Force

Advancing Defense: Why the DoD Needs a Dedicated Autonomous Force to Maintain America’s Technological Edge

As the global power competition increases pressure on innovation cycles, the Department of Defense (DoD) needs to make some fundamental changes to maintain America’s technological edge. Specifically, it needs to transition from a human-centric force to an autonomy-centric one. For the transition to be effective, the DoD’s workflows and processes need to be adapted for the 21^st century. We need to create a dedicated service inside the DoD to focus on fielding the latest technologies – we need to create an Autonomous Force as the fifth branch of service.

Technological cycles

Analyzing tech innovation cycles, we can clearly distinguish between incremental improvements and step changes. Most software applications and consumer electronic devices are updated and improved every 12 to 18 months. Step changes occur approximately every 10-years when new technology is introduced, such as digitalization in the 1990s, the internet in the 2000s, mobile communications in the 2010s, and artificial intelligence (AI) today. As the pace of global competition accelerates, we should expect defense related technological step changes to become more frequent, much like the 1950s – Air Force went from subsonic F-86 to a supersonic missile only-armed F-4s in less than 10 years.

Improved products can be rolled out reasonably quickly as the organizational changes required are very limited – existing workflows and workforce’s job descriptions largely remain the same. However, technological step changes are more difficult to integrate since they require organizational changes. Generally, start-up companies are much better positioned to adapt those new technologies since they are starting with a clean sheet and do not have to change existing workforce/workflows.

DoD’s Operating System

To integrate any new technology into its workflows, the DoD needs to develop new Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). TTPs are used to train personnel and standardize procedures. TTP is the operating system for the DoD. OODA (Observe, Orientation, Decision, and Action) loops are its CPUs. The faster the CPU, the better the computer. The same analogy applies to warfare – the faster the ability to execute OODA loops, the more likely the victory.

AI and Autonomy

More frequent technological step changes pose significant risks to current OODA and TTP frameworks. We should expect that every five years, completely new weapon systems with completely new capabilities will be introduced at scale. Trying to fit such a pace of technological change into existing frameworks would be like trying to run ChatGPT on a computer with Windows 95 and Intel Pentium processors (both technologies from mid-90s) – it wouldn’t work.

Current DoD processes are designed for a human-centric force, but we must equip the DoD to become an autonomy-centric fighting force. That force will need its own hardware and software to operate efficiently. The best way to adopt autonomy at scale is to start with a clean sheet design for the new service – Autonomous Force (Alpha Force). Its operating processes and philosophies would significantly differ from the current DoD in that it would leverage cutting-edge technologies and prioritize agility, adaptability, and innovation.

Alpha Force’s structure and responsibility

Alpha Force would be responsible for deployment of all autonomous systems at scale – developing operational strategies, manage procurement, and have its own personnel. It would operate just like the four other services and would be called by the combatant commands when conflict starts. However, due to its focus on an autonomy-centric force, Alpha Force would need to have its own operating philosophies that are different from the rest of the DoD – three specific differences:

1. Procurement and innovation management

2. Workforce management

3. Inventory management

Procurement and innovation management

Currently, the DoD procurement process starts with development of CONOPS (Concepts of Operations), basically a strategy document that outlines capabilities required. Following CONOPS, a detailed requirements document is issued for procurement. This procurement operates on two-to-three-year cycles. If Alpha Force is to operate the latest technologies, its procurement process needs to be in months vs years. Furthermore, requirement driven purchasing will also not work since the latest technologies are generally not developed inside large bureaucracies, but by entrepreneurs creating products in their garages. Alpha Force’s innovation strategy should be market driven – scan the market for the latest technologies and discuss capability gaps with entrepreneurs. This is fundamentally different from the current state where DoD has a monopoly on product development and future visions of warfare. DoD and perhaps a few think-tanks are the only relevant entities for creating the strategies/futuristic concepts of warfare. This myopic approach fails to tap the full potential of American entrepreneurship and limits serendipity. For example, cloud computing initially built to provide large scale compute capabilities, ended up changing how software is delivered/used inside organizations. Alpha Force should enable entrepreneurs to do the same – demonstrate not only products, but also systems of how those and other products would operate together. Following successful demonstration, Alpha Force should develop CONOPS (Concepts of Operations) around new systems vs having CONOPS drive the requirements and purchasing process. This type of procurement process would be very similar to the Replicator program launched by DIU.

Workforce management

To rapidly adopt new technologies, we need workflow flexibility. That is why Alpha Force should be primarily made up of contract engineers who would be external contractors on four-to-five-year contracts. The transient nature of the workforce would provide for more frequent iteration of workflows. Alpha Force would operate under “move up or out” principals, where the most capable would be offered full time employment and promotion to officer cadre. This structure would allow the force to pay market salaries for engineering talent, frequently refresh talent, and quickly change workflows to adopt new technologies.

To keep iteration cycles fast, Alpha Force should be kept purposefully small. Numbering in perhaps the low tens of thousands. While its personnel would undergo basic training, the key to the Force’s success is discovery and adoption of latest technologies. Alpha Force should develop an office that resembles a corporate development function in the private sector – that office would be tasked with scoping latest technologies and understanding how to evaluate and integrate those technologies into the Force.

Inventory management

To keep up with the latest technologies, inventory management would need to be organized around different principals. For example, most US missiles have a shelf life of 10 to 20 years. DJI (Chinese drone manufacturer) releases new/upgraded drones every two to three years. Similarly, we should expect autonomous weapons to be upgraded with new versions every four to five years. These rapid upgrade cycles make wholesale replacement of inventory cost prohibitive but necessary. New drones don’t just have improved batteries and sensors, but also utilize new materials and advanced aerostructures to deliver improved performance - DJI claims that Mavic 3 has 35% less drag than Mavic 2. To maintain our advantage, our servicemen, need access to the LATEST technologies, not the LAST technology stockpiled in military bases.

To effectively cost-manage stockpiling strategies, Alpha Force should explore buying manufacturing capacity from commercial manufacturers – this would allow for quick scaling of production in times of need without requiring expensive outlays to build factories. Buying manufacturing capacity would provide required flexibility to quickly start manufacturing latest products. A capacity buying program could resemble the Maritime Security Program, where DoD pays commercial shippers a retainer to have access to their shipping capacity in times of need. When not required by the DoD, shippers are free to conduct their commercial activities.

Conclusion

Large systems do not change on their own, they only change when an alternative is offered. DoD is facing a technological step function where it must evolve from human-centric to autonomy-centric warfare. The old system of relying on TTPs and CONOPS is inadequate for this step change. We need to start creating an alternative system to transition to the future where warfare is fully autonomous. Creation of Alpha Force allows for creation of such an alternative and with it a strong commitment to futureproofing the DoD.